Narrative identity construction (& Ricoeur!).

I found this article by Bradbury & Miller really helpful.

You see – I’ve been trying to get my head around Paul Ricoeur, and failing pretty miserably. I often find that I’m like that with critical theory kind of stuff (I’m not sure if PR is actually considered critical theory, though, tbh) … I understand the general concept, but I certainly couldn’t explain it. I feel like it’s one of my shortcomings as a PhD student and pseudo-academic, because I’m surrounding by these people who just get it, and that makes me feel, well, unintelligent.

Anyway. This article was good & helpful.

Theorizing a life as narrative, text, or a story to be told or read in multiple ways suggests that our identity (who we are or whom we become) is amenable to change and creative interpretation (687).

I like the idea that, as people, we’re incomplete. (I mentioned this in a post yesterday or the day before, re: Anne Helmond.) Not incomplete in the sense that there is something missing, but rather that the notion of a finished, entire self is always elusive. Perhaps this extends to the concept of the “true self”, too; I used to think that it was possible to know the self entirely, but now I am not so sure. So much of who we are stems from our interaction with others, and others’ reading of us, that it seems all too convenient to think that one could ever truly know oneself. After all, another’s impression and interpretation of who we are can hold particular salience… and what’s to say that that is less important than who we think we are?

What if I’m an arsehole, but I don’t know it? Surely others around me can see that better than I can. Just because I don’t know I’m an arsehole, doesn’t mean I’m not one.

(Now I have gone off on a tangent worrying about whether or not I am an arsehole. Gosh this is unprofessional.)

Ricoeur (1981) argues that textuality provides a “model” for human action, suggesting that the construction of meaning in reading is similar to the interpretive analysis required to understand human action in general… we conceptualize the development of identity as an interpretive task, whereby the self is constructed and reconstructed by the complementary process of distanciation and appropriation (688).

I believe that what Bradbury & Miller are getting at here is that we need to be able to look at the self from the outside in order to have any hope of knowing who we really are. Distanciation implies that we need to look at ourselves from the outside: in some cases, by writing the self into being and reading it back. It’s a physical distance, especially when we write to another, and a temporal distance. I know that I have had the strange experience of reading over old blog posts from three, or six, or eight years ago, and being quite surprised by the voice that I once embodied. On the other hand, appropriation suggests that as we move around in cultural spaces, we take elements of others’ doing: parts of their stories, and their experiences, and we make them our own, forging a sense of self through the words and experiences of others.

One of the recurrent themes throughout this article is this sense that we, as human beings, do not ever exist in a vacuum. We are contextually situated and constructed… as much a part of the landscape and of shared experience as we are of our own selves.

Stories of struggles, dreams, compromises, unexpected opportunities, and ways of overcoming obstacles encourage learners to challenge the limits of their envisaged futures and to think in flexible, diverse ways about the world of work (690).

The above quote is particularly pertinent in the context of blogging, I think. Blogging – being a blogger, writing a blog, speaking to an (invisible/assumed/silent/whatever) audience – puts one in the strange position of always having an audience. Of course, what people choose to share varies significantly, but there is a good chance that many (most?) personal bloggers in particular will talk about their dreams, and their setbacks. When you lead such a public life, via publicly articulated narrative identity, you invite others to share in your triumphs and struggles, insofar as you are willing to keep this audience informed, of course. Bradbury & Miller talk about this in the context of education and work, but I think that it applies to personal growth more generally, too. The stories of others, they are saying, can be used to make sense of one’s own life, especially in shared context, but not necessarily so. I guess thinking about my own experiences in reading blogs: I have read about topics that I never would have thought about, or have not been so affected by, in my own life (death, birth, physical & personal triumph, heartache, infertility). So many of these are negative, but in many ways, we learn so much more from the bad than from the good. A bit further along, the following kind of echoes this:

…the world of individual thought is always mediated or penetrated by the other, who is always a sociocultural other (691).

We are, always, interlinked and intertwined in the lives of others, as they are in ours, and this fusion creates identity. We understand, through others, what we are, and what we are not. This is quite Goffmanesque I think! Understanding the other leads to the understanding of the self, and vice versa. We regulate behaviour in light of this understanding (690).

Language (or discourse) simultaneously regulates us and creates the possibility for novelty, resistance, and interpretation… (692).

We do so much through language. It’s really the root of my entire thesis: How do we choose the words to form the narratives that tell the stories of our lives? How do we choose what to tell and what to withhold? McAdams is a name that keeps coming up again and again; this time, he notes:

“Language is indeterminate. Every word is ambiguous in and of itself, and its particular meaning in a particular moment is dependent on its relation to other equally ambiguous words with which it is spoken and written” (McAdams, 2001, p.115) (692).

I love this idea – it really appeals to the linguistics nerd within. Words are, essentially, arbitrary; some of them carry some weight, of course (I’m thinking particularly of swear words here, which carry the stigma of offensive language, and of cancer, which is so sharp a word it should almost be written Cancer, and never said in anything other than the most serious tone), but it’s not until they are put together, formed and shaped into sentences and statements, that they become more meaningful. And this is what Ricoeur is saying:

“…the literary work is the result of a labour which organises language” (Ricoeur, 1981, p.136).

There is something so beautiful and romantic about that statement, that I had to write it out and stick it on the wall of my office:

To me, there is something so organic about this statement: the notion that literature is something that emerges from arbitrariness if you just work hard enough at it (if you labour at it, coax it in to being, and mould it yourself).

One thing that I don’t agree with from this article, in the context of my own research, is the following statement:

The distance of text makes dialogue impossible; the author is absent or not directly accessible through face-to-face social interaction. The distance between the author’s world of experience and the text is furhter compounded by the distance between the possible world revealed by the text and the world of the reader’s experience (693).

Now, of course, the Internet has massively changed the way that we look at & read text. The author of a blog is still (usually) not available through face-to-face social interaction, but the distance between author & reader is, I would argue, lessened in the online context. The author is more reactive and available than a traditional print author, just as the audience (readers) of a blog are more vocal & involved than that of traditional print. The relationship between author & reader changes significantly in this context. Bradbury & Miller go on to suggest (I think!) that texts are more useful as they are read, than as they are written,

…with text providing a kind of impetus or immanent prospect for the reader to generate new understandings of the self (693).

They continue;

The self or identity, far from being an individual or bounded interior entity, is that which we construct by the “long detour of the signs of humanity deposited in cultural works”. The “real” self is an imagined or projected possibility rather than something hidden, whole, to be discovered or unearthed behind the text, or even behind behaviour or consciousness (693).

Quoting Ricoeur (1981, p.143 — check) here, Bradbury & Miller are discussing the self as it is constructed from within other selves. Or, perhaps not within, but alongside? That suggests though that we are somewhat independent, and I’m not sure from this reading that we are. But if we’re not independent… ?

I’m not sure. One thing that I am definitely getting from this article is this sense that, because of the impossibility of the ‘real’ self, we have to be constructed, at least partially, from others’ interpretations of us. I think that Bradbury & Miller are urging us – as individuals, as collectives – to think about what our everydayness means in the context of the bigger picture of life –

…we can treat our lives, ourselves, the human life-world of action as a kind of text: read them, interpret them, appropriate their meanings across a distance (694).

Again, this returned to that idea of nothing existing in a vacuum; we are in and of a greater world order, and all of our actions, words, thoughts, interpretations, are influenced by others, but also influence others, too. As human beings, we are constantly engaged in a process of meaning-making; we take time to think about things, to talk through them with others, to think about why what we are doing or experiencing is important. Dan McAdams (2001) talks about this too; Bradbury & Miller summarise it as such:

McAdams (2001) … suggests that in the same way that a narrative structure connects events or episodes across time and place, identity construction entails a “synchronic” synthesis of selves across roles and relationships and a “diachronic” synthesis of selves across time (695).

Now this… this is king of Goffman, no? This idea that we have many selves or roles that we play, but they’re all essentially part of the same being. Diachronic means pertaining to changes in linguistics over time… I’m not sure how this fits in.

However, implications of coherence and structure, and the idea that identity may be a crisis to be “solved” once and for all during a particular developmental phase of life, is negated by postmodern characterizations of life as non-linear and fragmentary, more loosely discursive than narrative (695).

Postmodernism, it would seem, challenges the idea that life narratives can even be. There are parts that fit together, but the fact that there is no final product – no whole, no completeness – does this challenge the idea of a narrative? I think a problem with this reading is that it assumes that life narratives are linear. Blogs aren’t linear. The way that we think and tell stories – they’re not linear. Perhaps what we do when we tell stories of the self is that we mentally hyperlink events, associatively linking together events and experiences across space and time. No one tells their story as it happens; no one even understands their story as it happens. Citing Ricoeur (1984), Bradbury & Miller note:

… understanding is impossible in the onslaught of the present and that it is only in retrospect that we can “know” the past (the moment just flash or the century way back; that of ourselves or of others) retrospectively. Immediate experience is unknowable… (695)

We are aware of things as they happen, obviously, but what they are about – their significance – only makes itself known to us retrospectively, as we gather experience and perspective and hindsight, and make sense of what has happened. Because of this, everything that we do in life involves some kind of “narrative work” (696) in order to understand life.

Postmodernism would suggest that this is impossible, though. I’m not sure that I will even go in to this in my thesis, because there is a lot of pomo stuff that I don’t necessarily agree with (they were all high, right?), but I thought the following was interesting:

Postmodernity simultaneously erases directionality (and coherence) and dissolves the subject, suggesting perhaps that all that remains are authorless intertextual worlds rather than narrating subjects (re)creating identities (697).

This idea is kind of grim, I think! It completely does away with the idea of the individual as important or even existant, favouring instead colliding, intertwined circumstances, in which it is the events – the placement of everything in this worlds, the interactions – rather than the experiential individuals, that actually matter. So if there no subjects, no authors, no narrators, and no narratives, then there are no identities, and this project is completely pointless.

Unless it is the blogs – as authorless, intertextual worlds – rather than the narrator-bloggers themselves, that is important. Perhaps the words on the page, how they bring together this intersection of physical and virtual space and experience, rather than the person using or telling the stories, that is important. In thinking about life and what it means and creating stories of experiences, we render them inauthentic. Vice (2003) agrees with this, as Bradbury & Miller discuss:

She concludes that the storied or narrative view of life is a delusion because it imposes order that isn’t there, because there is another kind of reality that is authentic or really, really human that lies outside of all this reflexivity/thinking/interpretation (697).

Life is a delusion? Is Vice suggesting that we do away with thought – or at least stop placing such weight on the conclusions that we draw – because they don’t matter anyway? But if they don’t matter, then why do we spend so much damn time thinking about things and making sense of them and putting them into narratives so that we may share with others? WHY? I guess that’s one of my problems with much of this: if it’s something we do so intrinsically, is there any point in denying it, other than to be controversial? Surely Vice is as human as I am: surely she thinks about things and plays them over in her mind and shares with others. To not share, to avoid telling the stories of our lives in order to make sense of them, seems almost sociopathic. I wonder what her friends and lovers think, if she never shares anything because there is no point.

Or maybe, having accepted it as delusion, she shares it anyway, being content in the knowledge that it does not matter.

 

reference: Bradbury, Jill & Miller, Ronald (2010), ‘Narrative possibilities: Theorizing Identity in a Context of Practice‘. Theory & Psychology 20(5), pp. 687-702


Adam Reed, blogging & agency

Note to self: Though slightly outdated by 2009 standards, Reed provides a decent background to blogging up to 2005. Consult for background chapter.

Reed aims to look at the blog as anthropological text, by focusing on “the ways in which people hold that texts can act as substitutes or extensions of them” [224]. Thinking of text as person, Reed’s argument could fit in well with the idea of blogged self as substitute/simulation – more real than real, it stands in the place of a self that cannot always be truly present (and, given the mediated nature of the self online, this blogged self will only ever be a portion of the ‘true self’ — not that this makes it any less authentic than the offline, physical self, as this self too only ever shows a particular face…). Reed asks a number of questions that are pertinent to my own research, including “Who does it substitute for? How is agency extended? … How is the ‘person’ composed and how does that composition alter over time?” [224].

Reed conducted an ethnographic study of bloggers, using both online and face-to-face interviews in order to gather his data. Speaking of one of his subject’s blogs, Reed notes:

These entries, and the ones I read later, in the following weeks and months, enforced the impression that here was the world as Leo saw it. The weblog appeared to provide a day-by-day account of passing moods and experiences, of his life as it happens. [226].

What Reed is saying here is simply but poignant; a blog has traditionally been a space wherein the author can present their view of the world, as interpreted through their own experiences and ideologies. In my ever-present fear of the corruption of blog culture (through advertising and freebies and what not), I fear that this personalised view of the world might be under threat. Reed voices perfectly the sentiment that I hope all blogs should entail.

Reed goes on to discuss the fact that “the ‘I’ narrative” [226-227] is central to blogging, with the “entity depicted in the digital text” responsible for narrating and perpetuating a coherent (but not necessarily streamlined) whole. The blog and the blogged self are both dynamic, contrastingly starkly with the more “static” representations of personhood found in print and on earlier webpages (227); this dynamism is largely credited to the frequent updating of blogs:

At the heart of journal blogging is an ethos of immediacy. Weblogs entries are meant to be ‘of the moment’, a record of how the individual felt or thought at that particular point in time. The claim that the text and subject can be temporally contiguous relies on the assumption of virtuality, but also on the ease of online publishing that allows posts to be put down on the digital page straight away… the weblog is valued for capturing a person’s impressions almost as they occur. [227]

Reed proceeds to contemplate the status of blog-as-therapy [228], “a means of clearing the mind in order to move a subject’s though processes along”. This concept is analogous to early beliefs such as the Ancient Greek hupomnemata, where it was perceived that a person only had so much room in the mind, and must write down thoughts in order to make room for new learnings, and not forget them in the future. These notes to the self were then used as memory-joggers in the future, a permanent record of previous lessons that could be referred to as needed. A blog operates in much the same way.

There are always aspects of the subject that remain outside or beyond the text, impressions that they cannot or do not want to post. What is censored and why seems to obey no coherent rule…; the most important thing for bloggers is that the claim stands, acting as an implicit defence of their fullness of being… In fact, the digital text is taken to provide a partial version of the subject. [230]

The above quote will tie in nicely with a discussion of symbolic interactionism and performance in chapter four. For Reed, the above provides a tidy opening into the role of audience in blogging. Reed argues that “As well as drawing out the ways in which the digital text substitutes for the ‘I’ of the blogger, individuals are concerned to explore how it mediates between persons after publication” [230]. The blog, as public document, is received in different ways online, and has the potential to be remediated easily – as re-postings on other people’s blogs, or even in the way that it is interpreted and regarded. The blogger must be aware that the self they present online via their blog is the only version of that self that many of their readers will ever encounter. This provides a double-edged sword situation: on the one hand, bloggers may try not to offend or shock their readership, in order to avoid controversy (as an example). On the other hand, doesn’t this censored version of self imply deceit of the audience? Reed later mentions, however, that “the most important visitor to the text is the blogger… this document is produced so a subject can view himself or herself in a mediated form, exteriorised as text” [231]. There is something inherently exhibitionist about the blogger, though:

She compared weblogs to the graffiti that one finds across the city, texts left for strangers to read… the blogger was like someone who leaves scrawled notes on park benches and inside telephone boxes, or who tacks postcards to the front doors of public buildings. [232]

Reed also considers the reasoning behind blogging (i.e. using a public document to record one’s history) and a more private diary [233]. Undoubtedly, the public nature of a blog leads to more editing than one would perhaps employ in a traditional diary, and yet the potential for feedback and the knowledge that someone is hearing your voice are unparalleled.

NB: Discussion of celebrity bloggers (236-238) might be relevant to part 5 of chapter 2?

Texts to consult:

Gell 1986. Writing Culture.

Reference:

Reed, A. (2005). “‘My blog is me’: Texts and persons in UK online journal culture (and anthropology).” Ethnos v.70 n.2


Paul Ricoeur on the body

I will start off by saying that Paul Ricoeur writes like an absolute mofo. I’m not even sure that he understands what he is saying, let alone me, so excuse me if my interpretation of his work is totally wrong.

Right. Paul Ricoeur. I was hoping to find some snazzy document or blog post out there on the Net to back up my ramblings here, but I could not, because it seems that no one else is nuts enough to tackle the subject. I jotted down a few notes as I was reading, but I’m really not sure what kind of use they will be…

Ricoeur straddles the dichotomy between Cartesian dualism and the perception that the mind and body are not only inherently linked, but that they have an affect upon each other. He writes:

The priority given to bodies is of the highest importance for the reason of person. For, if it is true, as we shall state later, that the concept of person is a notion no less primitive than that of the body, this is to evoke not a second referent, distinct from the body, such as the Cartesian soul, but in a manner yet to be determined, a single referent possessing two series of predicates: physical predicates and mental predicates. The fact that persons are bodies too is a possibility that is held in reserve in the general definition of basic particulars, according to which the latter are bodies or possess bodies. Possessing bodies is precisely what person do indeed do, or rather what they actually are. [Ricoeur 1992, 33].

Can we interpret Ricoeur as arguing for the body, given that traditionally the mind has been privileged over the flesh? The Cartesian mind/body split ties in well with early Internet studies work, harking back to a time when the Internet was well and truly regarded a non-physical space (oh, how times have changed!). Ricoeur seems to arguing that, instead of insisting upon a privileged mind that is in control of a body, we would be better off thinking of a privileged personhood which encapsulates elements both of mentality and physicality – “predicates” that allow the mind and body to work together to create a dynamic whole (the individual). People – with the psyche/personality being labeled property of the “mind” – inhabit bodies, and thus our phsyical presence is implicit and unavoidable.

To be honest, I didn’t read a lot of the Ricoeur I have on hand, though I will definitely revisit it when I’ve been doing some more reading (and when it’s more relevant to my current research – this fits in with a much later chapter). However, his discussion of spatiotemporal bodies in society is deliciously relevant to my own work, so I will attempt to consider some of his argument in real-person words. Ricoeur asks us to consider not only the way that we, as individuals, engage with the spatio-temporal setting that our bodies inhabit in a singular sense (i.e., how we ‘fit into’ our bodies), but also how we as bodies fit in to the world around us – “to attack the problem of the person by way of that of objective bodies situated in one and the same spatiotemporal framework” [1992, 34]. He states that “the question of our own body returns to the forefront, no longer simply in terms of our belonging to a single spatiotemporal schema, but in terms of the relation of our own body to the objective world of bodies” [1992, 34].

This reasoning would see bodies interpreted as material, and therefore as objects – but this confuses me, as wouldn’t the interpretation of the body as an objective material item (rather than a being) mean that Cartesian dualism is here employed? Can we regard other bodies as objects and yet still acknowledge that they possess a degree of subjectivity – one that we do not engage with unless compelled to do so? Is a person (and thus a body) operating in space, simply another object until turned into subject? Ricoeur seems to answer this challenge somewhat, proposing that “one does not see how the property of selfhood could be placed in a list of predicates ascribed to an entity, even one as original as the person” [1992, 34]. Perhaps, then, I am to interpret Ricoeur here as saying that it is our lack of comfort in thinking of other human beings as objective entities and subjective individuals, depending on the setting, that inhibits us of thinking of human beings as bodies in space that are simultaneously also subjective individuals.

Reference:

Ricoeur, P. 1992. Oneself as another [trans. Kathleen Blamey]. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, pp.33-35


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